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Interpretations of John Dewey’s political theory grasp his respect for public de-
liberation, but typically overlook his ethical justification for democracy. Dewey 
gave two primary reasons why democracy is superior to other forms of gov-
ernment. First, a public educated in the tools of social intelligence can be more 
effective at managing their social conflicts. Second, all people have an ethical 
right to become as valuable to their communities as they can become. Dewey 
judged that only democracy ensures each person’s ethical right to participate in 
social deliberation for the entire community’s benefit. Dewey’s model of social 
deliberation, “public deliberation polyarchy,” applies a kind of “logic” for col-
lective action, a process effective because of its ethical foundations. 
John Dewey developed sophisticated theories for a liberal civil society and a de-
liberative democracy. These theories have recently enjoyed renewed attention, dis-
cussion, and practical application.1 However, no consensus on Dewey’s primary 
theoretical strategies has yet emerged.2 What precisely was Dewey’s justification 
for democracy and its superiority over other ways of life and forms of government? 
This essay explains how Dewey attempted to formulate a philosophical justifica-
tion for democracy on ethical grounds, rather than just epistemic or satisfaction-
maximization grounds alone. Provided with a solid ethical foundation, progressive 
and participatory democracy could become a practical, achievable, and highly re-
warding endeavor for citizens. This paper offers a detailed exploration of Dewey’s 
attempted justifications for his democratic theory, which have eluded almost all 
political theorists, and until this essay have not been carefully analyzed. Criticisms 
of his political theory and its ethical foundations, practical inadequacies, and con-
ceptual confusions are deferred for separate treatment. Deferred as well are com-
parisons between Dewey’s position, classical liberalism, recent cosmopolitanism, 
and other political theories. 
Like many great political philosophers before him, Dewey held that the proper 
function of politics is to manage social conflict for the benefit of all involved. This 
view of the proper function of politics alone, while concerned for the general good, 
does not rise to the ethical level expected in Dewey’s political theory. Managed de-
mocracies, aristocracies, and the like, composed by those who possess better claim 
E&C    EduCation and CulturE
4    John shook
to know what is best for all, or merely those who exercise superior power that luckily 
benefits the whole, cannot receive approval from Dewey’s ethical politics. Dewey 
did not justify democracy solely on the utility of social intelligence, and therefore 
his political theory cannot be criticized for overlooking how expert intelligence 
can sometimes outperform social intelligence. Dewey gave two primary reasons 
why democracy is superior to aristocracy or any other form of government. First, a 
people educated in the tools of social intelligence can be more effective at managing 
their social conflicts than any aristocracy of expertise. Second, all persons have a 
moral right to become as valuable to their communities as they can become. When 
combined, these two reasons for democracy’s superiority result in Dewey’s conclu-
sion that only full participatory democracy can ensure each person’s moral right to 
participate in social deliberation for the entire community’s benefit.
The particular type of participatory democracy designed by Dewey is what is 
here termed “public deliberation polyarchy.” In public deliberation polyarchy, citi-
zens motivated by common concerns organize into publics for political activism, 
and compete for the general public’s sympathy and the government’s attention. On 
Dewey’s theory, voting is but one of many important activities that citizens can do 
to exercise their political power, and therefore pessimistic calculations about either 
the effectiveness or rationality of voting are only marginally relevant to judging 
Dewey’s model of democracy. Dewey’s model of social deliberation, as will be ex-
plained, applies a radically different type of “logic” for collective action. What makes 
this logic of social deliberation effective for achieving democracy’s aims, according 
to Dewey, is a solidly ethical foundation. Democracy essentially is a practical tool 
for important moral aims. 
Dewey’s political philosophy is explained by successively considering seven 
distinct views about his justification of democracy. We first look at some inadequate 
views, and in the course of demonstrating their failure to correctly interpret Dewey, 
we are led to more adequate approaches. The first three inadequate views to be dis-
cussed are here labeled the American Tradition Justification, the Rights Justification, 
and the Freedom Justification. After hearing what Dewey has to say about tradition, 
rights, and freedom, we then proceed to consider three better theories about how 
Dewey attempted to justify democracy, here called the Epistemic Justification, the 
Individualism Justification, and the Ethical Justification. 
The Epistemic Justification is the interpretation of Dewey most widely adopted 
by knowledgeable scholars, and for good reason: it adequately captures Dewey’s con-
cerns for rights, freedoms, and social intelligence. However, it is unfortunate that too 
much of Dewey scholarship has been stalled at this stage of interpretation, because 
the Ethical Justification view is a far better interpretation of Dewey’s justification of 
democracy. Going one final step further, key aspects of Dewey’s ethical theory, along 
with provocative writings of his later period, reveal that Dewey ultimately proposed 
the Moral Community Justification for progressive and participatory democracy. 
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The Moral Community was, according to Dewey, both the practical pathway to de-
mocracy’s fulfillment and the philosophical justification for democracy’s superiority.
thE amErican tradition Justification
Dewey believed that confidence should be restored in 
traditional modes of democracy in America, such as the 
“town hall meeting.”
According to this simplistic notion of Dewey’s fondness for democracy, he called 
for America to preserve its traditions of small town and rural agrarian democracy 
during a time of accelerating urbanization and industrialization. The American Tra-
dition Justification is a severe distortion of Dewey, because (1) nowhere in Dewey’s 
writings does he use small town democracy as a positive inspiration for modern 
political theory; and (2) Dewey never thought that specific forms of political ma-
chinery were sacred or intrinsically better for all times and conditions.
Dewey’s political theory does tightly link “community” and “democracy” as 
mutually supportive structures. Dewey often sought ways to strengthen the social 
bonds of communities in order to build a workable democratic politics, which in 
turn fosters the kinds of liberties needed for the growth of new communities. How-
ever, it would be a mistake to assume that Dewey’s reference to “community” is a sign 
only pointing backwards to tradition. Critics have perhaps been misled by Dewey’s 
suggestion (in The Public and Its Problems) that small town life provides an example 
of a democratic community.3 Dewey could not fail to acknowledge a prominent ex-
ample from the historical origins of democratic community in America. However, 
after this passage he recounts the emergence of large cities, powerful states, and a 
strong national government. Noting that this momentum could not be reversed, 
and the founders’ image of America is hopelessly inadequate today, Dewey declares 
that “The community pattern is more complicated, but is not destroyed.”4 Although 
small town life can be an example of a genuine community, Dewey did not mean 
to say that it should be the only or even best form of community life. In The Public 
and Its Problems Dewey explores ways to grow communities appropriate to urban 
civic life, and offers a vision of a genuinely moral community adequate for large 
populations, the Great Community. 
By taking a historical perspective on democracy’s evolution, Dewey never sup-
posed that some specific form of political machinery could be justified for all times 
and places. Town hall democracy could not be exalted as approaching perfection; 
indeed, specific democratic institutions must not be confused with the ideal of de-
mocracy itself. He wrote, “There is no sanctity in universal suffrage, frequent elec-
tions, majority rule, congressional and cabinet government.”5 By sharply distin-
guishing the “democratic idea” from any concrete democratic institution, Dewey 
refused to define democracy primarily in terms of some set of political practices. 
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This distinction provides for Dewey’s pragmatic ground from which he can criti-
cize actual institutions, according to whether they serve current needs of advanc-
ing democracy. However, what is Dewey’s “democratic idea”? Dewey does have a 
sophisticated idea of democracy, and it has a great deal to do with the rights and 
freedoms so important for democracy.
thE rights Justification
Dewey believed that democracy is the best form of 
government because it is grounded on basic rights for 
citizens, rights that Dewey consistently defended.
Dewey was a staunch and vocal advocate for a wide variety of crucial political and 
civil rights. He was a founding member of the NAACP and marched for women’s 
suffrage. No public intellectual of his era was a more vigorous advocate of the rights 
of equal protection, free speech, voluntary association, due process, and political 
activism. However, the Rights Justification wrongly depicts Dewey as a political 
theorist who supposes that some basic rights can be identified and justified inde-
pendently from broader social and political contexts. For Dewey, the opposite is the 
case: the existence of rights are dependent on broader social and political contexts. 
Dewey continually cast scorn upon any notion, however central to past liberal 
reforms, that human nature could help justify the existence of “natural” rights and 
produce any type of democracy: “We cannot continue the idea that human nature 
when left to itself, when freed from external arbitrary restrictions, will tend to the 
production of democratic institutions that work successfully.”6 Dewey did not doubt 
that an evolutionarily robust set of distinctive human instincts and traits character-
ize the species and permit its sociality. However, such social elements are evidently 
compatible with a very wide array of social structures and governments proven vi-
able across human history.
The Rights Justification distorts Dewey because (1) Dewey argued that there 
really are no basic rights in the sense of “absolute,” “permanent,” or “natural” rights; 
(2) Dewey always talked of rights as contextual, provisional, and hypothetical tools 
for dealing with the needs of social organization; and (3) Dewey believed that rights 
are social artifacts, created by society’s bestowal of specialized responsibilities in 
the course of advancing the common good. 
The social context of rights was a consistent theme in Dewey’s political theory:
The social factor in rights is made explicit in the demand that the power in 
question be exercised in certain ways. A right is never a claim to a wholesale, 
indefinite activity, but to a defined activity; to one carried on, that is, under 
certain conditions. This limitation constitutes the obligatory phases of every 
right. The individual is free; yes, that is his right. But he is free to act only ac-
cording to certain regular and established conditions. . . . Absolute rights, if 
dEwEy's Ethical Justification for dEmocracy    7
Volume 29 (1) 2013
we mean by absolute those not relative to any social order and hence exempt 
from any social restriction, there are none. But rights correspond even more 
intrinsically to obligations. The right is itself a social outcome: it is the indi-
vidual’s in so far as he is himself a social member not merely physically, but 
in his habits of thought and feeling. He is under obligation to use his rights 
in social ways.7 
Dewey’s progressive liberalism does not accept the explanation that the politi-
cal realm must artificially establish rights, as rights cannot be found in individuals. 
While rights are not grounded on people as individuals, there is a social sphere of 
duties and rights that exists prior to, and relatively independent from, any political 
rights. Government is not instituted to protect individual rights, but rather to ad-
vance social welfare, and it undertakes this task by adding a layer of political duties 
and rights to those already functioning for the social sphere. Not only are there no 
presociety property rights or voting rights, all civil rights are likewise outgrowths 
from social progress: “It must be realized that civil rights, liberty of speech, assem-
bly, publication, are not merely individual rights, but are essential to the welfare, 
the healthy growth, of society.”8 Government should respect individuals’ rights (for 
example, judges should start from the existence of current rights), but the question 
of which rights people have must be decided by public deliberation about the social 
good. Similarly, the search for social progress by various societies will never converge 
on a single way of life, so there is no reasonable hope for empirically discovering a 
single best system of rights or of justice.9
Dewey does have many things to say about the concept of rights generally, 
which can only be summarized here. Negative rights, the guaranteed freedoms 
from public intervention and control, are indeed valuable according to Dewey, 
but other goods are also important and perhaps sometimes more important. For 
example, the category of positive rights, those rights which require public aid to 
provide some needed goods to people who cannot obtain them by themselves, will 
be valued much more highly by someone in a situation where negative rights alone 
are leaving them out of work, homeless, and starving. Defenders of negative rights 
(such as libertarians) complain that any positive right must violate some negative 
right, but always prioritizing negative rights is a questionable (and unrealistic) 
presumption. Dewey’s political theory instead finds that it is reasonable for real 
people in their actual social situations to deliberate over the relative prioritization 
of negative and positive rights, and to make pragmatic choices depending on their 
circumstances. Rather than obey some previous generation’s list of preferred rights, 
Dewey expected the people to periodically reconsider the value and efficacy of their 
rights, and to use all available methods of nonviolent social change from voting and 
petitioning to marching in order to achieve the modification or supplementation 
of those rights (Dewey himself marched in New York City for women’s suffrage, 
as biographers recount).
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Furthermore, Dewey could not regard negative rights as sufficient for democ-
racy, emphasizing that citizenship rights always carry responsibilities over and above 
correlate duties to avoid harming others. While Dewey did believe that democracy 
should deliberate about, and staunchly protect, some robust negative rights and 
some robust positive rights, Dewey’s political theory also proposes a third category 
of rights. He did not attach a label to this category, so I suggest the label of empower-
ment rights. A simple example is my right to drive a car. This right cannot be easily 
categorized as a negative right or a positive right, since the government may inter-
fere with the way I drive, and the government requires that I drive responsibly for 
the good of others as well as my own good. My right to drive a car is a right earned 
by learning how to drive safely and obey traffic laws. It is also a right with responsi-
bilities attached, since my right can be taken away if I fail to drive safely and legally. 
Empowerment rights are rights that empower a person to pursue their own good 
in some specified way under the responsibility requirement that they simultane-
ously exercise that pursuit in a way consistent with the greater good. A license to 
practice medicine is another common example of an empowerment right. It may 
be the responsibility of the government to help people gain empowerment rights, if 
having those empowerment rights is a sufficiently crucial community good. These 
“community” empowerment rights would therefore be rights in which the govern-
ment has the duty to empower a person for some capacity because that person can 
responsibly exercise that capacity for his or her own good and the community good. 
Dewey regarded three kinds of rights as necessary for the proper functioning 
of democracy. Dewey’s understanding of freedom is similarly sophisticated, as he 
also demands that freedoms be understood in their social context, and compre-
hended as more than just liberties.
thE frEEdom Justification
Dewey believed that democracy’s emphasis on human 
liberty provides a better opportunity for the people to 
enjoy freedoms: such as freedom of one’s chosen way of 
life, or freedom of thought, or freedom to enjoy the growth 
of experience.
While freedoms in a thin sense exist prior to and independent of any political so-
ciety, such freedoms have little significance or value. What people really want is 
never simply freedom in itself but rather real capacities: actual abilities to accom-
plish chosen goals. Because most of our capacities are developed and maintained 
by cooperation and instruction from others, capacities are typically social in na-
ture. Like rights, the freedoms worth valuing exist only in a social context. Dewey 
writes, “Liberty is that secure release and fulfillment of personal potentialities which 
take place only in rich and manifold association with others: the power to be an 
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individualized self making a distinctive contribution and enjoying in its own way 
the fruits of association. Equality denotes the unhampered share which each indi-
vidual member of the community has in the consequences of associated action.”10 
The freedom justification falls short of capturing Dewey’s approach to poli-
tics because (1) Dewey considered negative freedoms (placing restrictions on oth-
ers from obstructing one’s own efforts to achieve aims) to be inferior to positive 
freedoms (one’s real capacities to actually achieve intelligently considered aims); 
(2) Dewey never approved of such freedoms for their own sake, but always talked 
about freedoms in relation to the ultimate freedom to be intelligent; and (3) Dewey 
wanted freedoms to empower individuals for positively enhancing the social good. 
Liberty is indeed a supreme value of life. Yet its social nature, evident in both 
liberty’s causes and consequences, supplies both its justification and its limits. Like 
his position on civil rights, Dewey was explicit about the social nature and justifi-
cation of civil liberties:
The only hope for liberalism is to surrender, in theory and practice, the doctrine 
that liberty is a full-fledged ready-made possession of individuals independent 
of social institutions and arrangements, and to realize that social control, es-
pecially of economic forces, is necessary in order to render secure the liberties 
of the individual, including civil liberties.11 
Liberties must be coordinated, not merely with each other, but more importantly 
with the pursuit of the social good of all:
Unless freedom of individual action has intelligence and informed conviction 
back of it, its manifestation is almost sure to result in confusion and disorder. 
The democratic idea of freedom is not the right of each individual to do as he 
pleases, even if it be qualified by adding ‘provided he does not interfere with 
the same freedom on the part of others.’ While the idea is not always, not of-
ten enough, expressed in words, the basic freedom is that of freedom of mind 
and of whatever degree of freedom of action and experience is necessary to 
produce freedom of intelligence. The modes of freedom guaranteed in the Bill 
of Rights are all of this nature: Freedom of belief and conscience, of expression 
of opinion, of assembly for discussion and conference, of the press as an organ 
of communication. They are guaranteed because without them individuals 
are not free to develop and society is deprived of what they might contribute.12 
Freedoms must be harmonized because a person’s free activities may interfere 
with, or completely eliminate, other persons’ opportunities for their own free activi-
ties. The attainment of any sort of balancing of freedoms, especially such balances as 
may improve society, requires thoughtful adjustment of limitations on peoples’ free-
doms. There could not possibly be any a priori method of setting such limits, since the 
modes of human action and types of social relations are innumerable and constantly 
growing, and the prioritization of those modes would have to be determined in ad-
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vance for all. An a priori method would therefore proceed only by artificially limit-
ing modes of action and imposing a prioritization on the people. The alternative to 
totalitarianism is democracy: the people themselves thoughtfully adjusting their free-
doms in light of their priorities. For Dewey, this is the genuine significance of liberty:
Liberty to think, inquire, discuss, is central in the whole group of rights which 
are secured in theory to individuals in a democratic social organization. It is 
central because the essence of the democratic principle is appeal to voluntary 
disposition instead of to force, to persuasion instead of coercion. Ultimate au-
thority is to reside in the needs and aims of individuals as these are enlightened 
by a circulation of knowledge, which in turn is to be achieved by free commu-
nication, conference, discussion.13 
Democracy is essentially the peaceful and thoughtful effort to justly balance free-
doms among persons, and therefore is a type of nonviolent conflict resolution. The 
proper justification of democracy, for Dewey, must be more about ethical social 
participation than about personal liberty.
thE EPistEmic Justification
Dewey proposed that democracy’s mode of public 
deliberation allows participants to learn how to peacefully 
resolve their social problems in the political sphere.
Dewey argued that citizenship in a democracy requires a small number of essential 
community empowerment rights that revolve around key civic virtues which promote 
tolerance for diversity, capacity for cooperation, and effectiveness in group delibera-
tion. Dewey’s theory of progressive democracy is a vision of the intelligent methods 
of public deliberation that permit genuine “self-rule” by the body of citizens. Civic 
education in Dewey’s sense, as developing capacities for the problem solving of public 
conflict resolution, is essential to the proper functioning of a democracy.14
The epistemic justification accounts for Dewey’s abiding concern for not merely 
the education and intelligence of the masses, but specifically for people’s capacity 
to participate in group problem solving about social conflicts. Dewey labels this 
capacity as “organized intelligence” or “social intelligence”:
Of course, there are conflicting interests; otherwise there would be no social 
problems. The problem under discussion is precisely how conflicting claims 
are to be settled in the interest of the widest possible contribution to the in-
terests of all—or at least of the great majority. The method of democracy—in-
sofar as it is that of organized intelligence—is to bring these conflicts out into 
the open where their special claims can be seen and appraised, where they 
can be discussed and judged in the light of more inclusive interests than are 
represented by either of them separately. . . . What generates violent strife is 
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failure to bring the conflict into the light of intelligence where the conflicting 
interests can be adjudicated in behalf of the interest of the great majority.15 
Dewey found in social intelligence the resources to reply to the oft-made accusation 
that decisions by majority rule are only rarely and coincidentally the wisest course. 
Dewey never thought that participatory democracies always produce the best re-
sults, especially according to current standards of justice or public welfare. All the 
same, our current standards are largely the result of past democratic deliberations 
and emerging majority decisions, and not from expert punditry or dictatorial fiat.
For Dewey, public conflict resolution is typically improved as more citizens are 
involved in its deliberations. Where fears are justified that some given number of 
citizens are inadequate to a novel problem, such as matters of international or even 
global concern, expanding the number of citizens involved is preferable to the alter-
native of handing over decisions of such vast magnitude to self-proclaimed experts. 
Comparisons with cosmopolitanism are beyond the scope of this article (readers 
may have noticed considerable overlap with cosmopolitanism already), yet it deserves 
mention that no one should assume that Dewey designed his theory of democracy 
solely for domestic politics sequestered within countries. Rather, Dewey insisted 
that democracy flourishes where all those affected can participate in deliberations 
regardless of recognized citizenship (in other words, citizenship is a by-product of 
effective participation, not the other way around). Yet mass deliberations can be slow 
and unsteady. Aristocracies always pride themselves on their speedy conclusions, 
as far fewer people are involved, and aristocracies also conveniently self-select their 
members by pre-established criteria of mutual admiration and agreement. However, 
these are not conditions favorable to the sort of robust inquiry and deliberation that 
Dewey has in mind. Larger majorities have greater epistemic validity than smaller 
majorities or tiny minorities, where general social welfare is concerned:
The ballot is, as often said, a substitute for bullets. But what is more significant 
is that counting of heads compels prior recourse to methods of discussion, 
consultation and persuasion, while the essence of appeal to force is to cut short 
resort to such methods. Majority rule, just as majority rule, is as foolish as its 
critics charge it with being. But it never is merely majority rule. As a practi-
cal politician, Samuel J. Tilden, said a long time ago: ‘The means by which a 
majority comes to be a majority is the more important thing’: antecedent de-
bates, modification of views to meet the opinions of minorities, the relative 
satisfaction given the latter by the fact that it has had a chance and that next 
time it may be successful in becoming a majority.16 
Although Dewey calls for enhancing the social conditions permitting democ-
racy to be more intelligent, many Dewey commentators have complained that he 
offers no pragmatic theory of the actual “machinery” of democratic deliberation. 
Perhaps they get distracted by Dewey’s own clumsy political activities and forget 
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to look for political theory in his writings. It is at least clear that Dewey did not in-
tend to hand over the government to expert intellectual elites, unlike critics such as 
his contemporary, Walter Lippmann. Lippmann derides participatory democracy, 
describing ordinary citizens as too ignorant, apathetic, and selfish to be capable of 
helping to govern for the public good.17 Dewey’s political theory answers each of 
these charges made against citizens.
The method of intelligence, according to Dewey, is first and foremost the logi-
cal process of problem solving. Confidence in democracy is therefore confidence 
in the intelligence of citizens to resolve social conflicts:
Democracy is a way of personal life controlled not merely by faith in human 
nature in general but by faith in the capacity of human beings for intelligent 
judgment and action if proper conditions are furnished. . . . For what is the 
faith of democracy in the role of consultation, of conference, of persuasion, 
of discussion, in formation of public opinion, which in the long run is self-
corrective, except faith in the capacity of the intelligence of the common man 
to respond with commonsense to the free play of facts and ideas which are 
secured by effective guarantees of free inquiry, free assembly and free com-
munication?18 
Commentators have not yet noticed something highly interesting about Dewey’s 
theory of problem solving and his theory of “publics”: the stages of each process 
match step for step. This is not a coincidence, but a confirmation that Dewey had 
concrete proposals for how democracy can pragmatically work in America. 
First, the stages of scientific inquiry, according to Dewey’s Human Nature and 
Conduct and Logic: The Theory of Inquiry. (1) A problem with habitual conduct 
arises. (2) The prevailing natural conditions are surveyed to discover which fea-
tures of the situation are relevant to the problem. (3) Hypotheses are formulated to 
suggest a course of action to resolve the problem. (4) One hypothesis is selected for 
experiment and its consequences are observed. (5) The problem is either solved, or 
the process returns to stage two.
Second, the stages of public inquiry, according to Dewey’s The Public and Its 
Problems. (1) A number of people become collectively aware that they suffer from the 
same social problem, and if they have sufficient interest and energy to work together 
on this problem, they form a “public.” (2) This new public, perhaps with the aid of so-
cial scientists, survey social conditions to identify which are probably responsible. (3) 
Hypotheses are formulated by this public, perhaps in alliance with other publics, to 
suggest what modifications to social structures and/or norms may alleviate the social 
problem. (4) If persuaded, a majority of the Public (the whole body of citizens) agrees 
to experiment with one of the proposed social modifications, pressures branches of 
local, state, and/or federal government to implement the modifications, and the ex-
periment’s consequences are observed. (5) The social problem is either alleviated suf-
ficiently so that the public loses energy/members, or the process returns to stage two.
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Both processes of inquiry presuppose some degree of community goodwill and 
respect for all participants, even as these processes encourage fierce competition be-
tween subgroup aims. This is the essence of democratic polyarchy: Political power is 
distributed over many energetic publics competing for community and government 
attention to their aims (such as political parties, religious organizations, businesses, 
unions, political action committees, trade groups, grassroots community groups, 
charities, etc.) Furthermore, both processes of inquiry assume the existence of routes 
of communication for sustaining both the community over the long run and for sup-
porting the emergence of new publics to compete with each other over the short run. 
Robert Dahl proposed the term “polyarchy” as a label for a society with political 
structures and norms that protected fair and effective competition among politically 
active citizens and their organized groups. Dewey’s theory of political democracy 
could be labeled “public deliberation polyarchy.”19 Dewey does agree with Dahl that 
a genuine democracy will facilitate the uprising of activist and protest groups, what 
Dewey labeled as publics, by providing conditions for easy communication, free as-
sociation, and honest media information. Furthermore, a genuine democracy will 
provide the sort of civic education that (1) fosters mutual respect and appreciation 
for all members of society, and (2) teaches the skills of collective problem solving. 
If a democracy can meet these minimal requirements, then those publics that do 
arise can frequently get a fair hearing before the entire community—the Public. 
Such a democratic society would also be more resistant to authoritarian tempta-
tions, which critics of liberal democracy fear would be irresistible to an underedu-
cated and apathetic populace. 
Dewey does not assume that those benefiting the most from the existing social 
structure will lead the way to progress; indeed, his theory of democratic publics as-
sumes that the opposite will remain the case. This is why he is so skeptical towards 
elitist theories of democracy (like Lippmann’s) that suppose that a class of comfort-
able intellectuals will work for the benefit of the entire society. Those benefiting least 
have the most problems to complain about, and have the most determination to 
cause change, all other things being equal. Of course, things are rarely so equal—
social structure and ideology obstruct the recognition of severe social problems 
even by the sufferers. Still, Dewey places the primary responsibility for attempting 
change upon those who suffer the problems. This seems profoundly unjust in spirit, 
but Dewey feared the alternative even more: placing the primary responsibility for 
detecting and solving social ills upon the shoulders of those who do not feel that 
suffering. Those who suffer must organize, protest, and propose change. This is 
Dewey’s naturalistic theory of cultural evolution: cultural evolution is not pulled 
by a supreme beneficent power but is instead pushed by the experimental testing 
of innumerable small and gradual modifications. 
Because politics proceeds incrementally, Dewey’s citizens need not each be the 
all-around political expert that Lippmann supposes would be required to make par-
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ticipatory democracy work. Against Lippmann’s charge of citizen ignorance, Dewey 
answers that organized publics can be very intelligent, especially when many intel-
lectuals work for them. Against the charge of apathy, Dewey answers that members 
of publics can be highly motivated, especially when they see evidence that their time, 
energy, and money is making a difference. Against the charge of selfishness, Dewey 
expects that citizens who demand that their suffering be recognized also be capable 
of caring about the suffering of others (here again civic education is crucial), so that 
publics and the citizens that make up the Public can view the democratic process 
as a potential win-win situation and not as a zero-sum game.
As demonstrated by this brief sketch of Dewey’s theory of public deliberation 
polyarchy, he was concerned to offer multiple ways of seeing how democratic de-
liberation, as opposed to the deliberations of elites, could improve the resolution 
of social conflicts. For many commentators, this ability of democracy constitutes 
Dewey’s best justification for democracy: democracy is the more practical tool for 
social conflict resolution for the social good. After all, a pragmatist should try to 
justify the social institution of democracy by its practicality.
Nevertheless, there are four major difficulties with taking the epistemic justi-
fication to be Dewey’s ultimate justification for democracy. (1) Dewey preferred to 
speak primarily of democracy as “a way of life” for all members of society and only 
secondarily as a mode of political activity for energized citizens. (2) Dewey regarded 
universal adult suffrage as essential to genuine democracy, rejecting the notion that 
only sufficiently capable deliberators should be politically active. (3) Dewey was al-
ways concerned that democracy be designed to idealistically search for the welfare 
of all members of society, and not for only what actual adult political participants 
view as good for themselves individually or collectively. (4) Democracy considered 
merely as a practical method for resolving social conflicts supplies but a vague cri-
terion for actually gauging social progress.
Dewey’s primary justification of democracy is not its practicality for experi-
menting with solutions to social conflicts (though he often enough pointed out 
this virtue). Nor does Dewey justify participatory democracy by claiming that de-
mocracies even frequently achieve improved welfare for all society (although that 
frequency is greater in the long run than any aristocracy or monarchy). Rather, 
like all other kinds of genuine inquiry, it is the committed search for the general 
good, and not its guaranteed achievement by some transcendent criterion, that 
characterizes democracy. 
Any advocate like Dewey for participatory democracy is targeted by the criti-
cism that “the general good” is hardly a reasonable goal, either because the notion is 
incoherent, or simply impractical. However, Dewey’s theory of democracy does not 
require achieving at one stroke the greatest welfare for all (there can’t be a formula 
for determining that), but it only demands our best efforts at incrementally mov-
ing towards that ideal goal through social change—and there is no lack of evidence 
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that democratic societies have accomplished such movements. Knowing that one’s 
society has shown fidelity to an ideal ethical goal by eliminating a social problem 
or conflict is quite possible, even if no one can precisely say what a society entirely 
fulfilling that ethical goal would look like.
Ethical ideals are too distant and vague for serving as immediate measures of 
social welfare, yet they still have their proper function for guiding democracies. 
One wishes for more specific and detailed guidance when democratic progress is 
unsteady, but there is no precise criterion of “the good” or “the right” to resort to 
when participatory democracies stumble, stalemate, or stagnate. Complaining that 
democracies occasionally require supplementation from other sources (pure reason? 
God?) is far more unrealistic than the hopes for democracy. Besides, democracy at 
its best, for Dewey, is a gradually self-corrective mode of social inquiry, akin to sci-
ence. Where do critics of democracy suppose absolute rights and values will arrive 
from? One might as well complain that scientific inquiry is inefficient compared 
to simply knowing nature transempirically. Science rightly replies that only more 
scientific inquiry can supply needed clues for improving scientific method. Democ-
racy is inefficient, to be sure, but democracy is humanity’s own social technology 
only to be gradually improved by more democracy by the people. Democracy’s cur-
rent foundations consist of our highest ethical ideals and already achieved political 
structures, and not any sort of transcendent or a priori principles. 
Ultimately, Dewey demanded that all of society have equal opportunity to par-
ticipate in deliberative politics and enjoy the benefits of social progress. His debate 
with Lippmann demonstrates this appeal. Lippmann’s main argument for elitist 
democracy was precisely that it was the most practical: an intellectual aristocracy 
could, arguably, best resolve social conflicts for the social good. Dewey rejected 
such an aristocracy, not by any empirical evidence of participatory democracy’s 
actual effectiveness (although he believed that adequate evidence was obvious), 
but because Dewey was more interested in defending the essence of democracy by 
concentrating on the ethical treatment of the actual people that compose society:
For democracy signifies, on one side, that every individual is to share in the 
duties and rights belonging to control of social affairs, and, on the other side, 
that social arrangements are to eliminate those external arrangements of sta-
tus, birth, wealth, sex, etc., which restrict the opportunity of each individual 
for full development of himself. On the individual side, it takes as the criterion 
of social organization and of law and government release of the potentialities 
of individuals. On the social side, it demands cooperation in place of coercion, 
voluntary sharing in a process of mutual give and take, instead of authority 
imposed from above. As an ideal of social life in its political phase it is much 
wider than any form of government, although it includes government in its 
scope. As an ideal, it expresses the need for progress beyond anything yet at-
tained; for nowhere in the world are there institutions which in fact operate 
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equally to secure the full development of each individual, and assure to all 
individuals a share in both the values they contribute and those they receive.20 
Dewey’s basic political orientation aligns him with much of the political tra-
dition of republicanism (though he rarely discussed it directly in his writings, for 
it wasn’t as common a political term then). Republicanism stresses that citizen-
ship is not defined by the citizen’s relationship to a government, but rather by the 
citizen’s relationship to fellow citizens. That relationship must be one of political 
equality and nondomination among peers, so that the body of citizens may freely 
exercise the capacity for self-ruling power.21 A republican conception of “equal op-
portunity” accordingly finds that everyone should have an equal opportunity to 
become empowered for meaningful political participation. Such opportunity must 
be provided by the public’s attainment of those community empowerment rights, 
through civic education, needed in the political sphere. If Dewey is related to re-
publicanism, only a very expansive republicanism could serve. Narrow versions of 
republicanism requiring ethnic homogeneity, nationalistic heritage, and the like 
cannot find any home in Dewey’s political theory.
This broad political equality, with the proviso that Dewey demanded universal 
adult suffrage, is Dewey’s primary understanding of equal opportunity (without 
denying that there are other needed forms of equal opportunity in the economic 
or social spheres). Equality of political empowerment and participation comes in 
many forms; there are numerous capacities for political involvement besides public 
conflict resolution that will not be discussed here. However, given that democracies 
will contain many social groups pursuing diverse values and hence causing many 
social conflicts, stable and peaceful democracies should pursue public conflict reso-
lution. Civic education for all, according to Dewey, is the instrument making the 
social intelligence of public deliberation possible in a republican democracy. In this 
sense, Dewey freely applied the label of “liberalism” to his political theory, writing 
that “Liberalism has to assume the responsibility for making it clear that intelli-
gence is a social asset and is clothed with a function as public as is its origin, in the 
concrete, in social cooperation.”22 Dewey’s political theory is thus a version of that 
fruitful convergence of republicanism and liberal democracy found in many modern 
thinkers. Dewey’s public deliberation polyarchy rests on the grounding principle that 
the dignity and self-fulfillment of every person should be of community concern. 
thE individualism Justification
Dewey believed that democracy’s emphasis on individuals 
is the essence of liberalism, which always seeks to expand 
opportunities for all individuals. 
According to the individualism justification, democracy is justified by its founda-
tional respect for the value and importance of all persons. Dewey repeatedly used 
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the concept of equal opportunity to indicate how every person’s capacities for suc-
cessful living must have social standing and importance. He declared, “The demo-
cratic faith in human equality is belief that every human being, independent of the 
quantity or range of his personal endowment, has the right to equal opportunity 
with every other person for development of whatever gifts he has.”23 Dewey explicitly 
connected the practical success of democracy with its promotion of equal opportu-
nity for all. He argued that the effectiveness of social problem solving is diminished 
if there are some members of society incapacitated for political participation. His 
theory of public deliberation polyarchy places the burden of noticing social prob-
lems and energizing publics upon the common people. Furthermore, there is no 
good sense in artificially limiting the portion of society fit for public deliberation: 
the more minds involved, the better, has been the modern scientific motto. Ensur-
ing equal opportunity for civic life makes double sense in a democracy: democracy 
is supposed to be for the people, and also by the people, to borrow Lincoln’s phrase: 
As far as I can see, the hope of maintaining democracy lies in using the enor-
mous resources that science has put in our hands to inaugurate not merely an 
age of material plenty and material security, but also of cultural equality of op-
portunity—the opportunity of every individual to develop to his full capacity.24 
This individualistic foundation for democracy must not be confused with that 
“rugged” individualism that from time to time has dominated the myths of the 
American dream. The notion of rugged individualism also appealed to the ideal of 
“equal opportunity” while ignoring the balancing ideal of social responsibility for 
enabling such opportunity. Consistent with his refusal to prioritize negative rights, 
Dewey sought social harmony and justice elsewhere, as noted above in the discus-
sion of positive rights and empowerment rights. The individualism justification 
captures Dewey’s demand that society take responsibility for people’s capacities. 
For example, Dewey argued that education should be life-long; retraining of adults 
for new jobs must be state-supported. Dewey’s preference for socialism, requiring 
both legislative restraint upon business and ample state funding for empowering 
individuals, is accounted for with the individualism justification. 
There remain two major problems for the individualism justification. (1) Given 
Dewey’s objections to excessive individualism, what sort of individuality does Dewey 
want? (2) How does Dewey explain why all human beings should enjoy equal op-
portunities? Dewey’s writings supply his clear answers to these valid questions, by 
moving to the realm of morality.
thE Ethical Justification
Dewey believed that democracy’s equal concern for the 
welfare of all persons supplies the ultimate ethical ground 
for the superiority of democracy.
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According to this justification, a firm commitment to an ethical principle of moral 
equality for all people grounds Dewey’s variety of individualism. This principle of 
human moral equality (elaborated in the next section on the Moral Community) 
is universal in the sense that Dewey intended to include all humanity regardless of 
cultural differences and regardless of whether democracy yet prevails in all societ-
ies. Dewey’s conception of this “human equality” is not grounded on any physical 
or material equality, supposed or real: we are firmly in the ethical realm of how 
people should be treated. 
Dewey’s demand for the universal application of this principle of human moral 
equality should not be confused with any sort of ethical universalism or absolut-
ism, which instead searches for timelessly and rationally valid moral truths that 
can never change. As a pragmatist, Dewey had no place in his philosophy for such 
quests. All the same, his democratic political theory is expressly grounded on a 
principled morality of human equality. Dewey discerned such a principle in the 
Founders’ intentions: 
With the founders of American democracy, the claims of democracy were 
inherently one with the demands of a just and equal morality. . . . What they 
asserted was that self-governing institutions are the means by which human 
nature can secure its fullest realization in the greatest number of persons. . . . 
We have advanced far enough to say that democracy is a way of life. We have 
yet to realize that it is a way of personal life and one which provides a moral 
standard for personal conduct.25 
Discovering the fuller import of Dewey’s phrase above that “democracy is a way of 
life” must await the moral community justification (below), towards which the ethi-
cal justification leads. What is already apparent is Dewey’s effort to bond together 
morality and politics in a way that modern liberalism has typically avoided. In the 
next selected passage, Dewey offers one of the most robust and detailed formula-
tions of his ethical principle of equality for democracy:
From the ethical point of view, therefore, it is not too much to say that the 
democratic ideal poses, rather than solves, the great problem: How to har-
monize the development of each individual with the maintenance of a social 
state in which the activities of one will contribute to the good of all the others. 
It expresses a postulate in the sense of a demand to be realized: That each in-
dividual shall have the opportunity for release, expression, fulfillment, of his 
distinctive capacities, and that the outcome shall further the establishment 
of a fund of shared values. Like every true ideal, it signifies something to be 
done rather than something already given, something ready-made. Because 
it is something to be accomplished by human planning and arrangement, it 
involves constant meeting and solving of problems—that is to say, the de-
sired harmony never is brought about in a way which meets and forestalls all 
future developments.26 
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For Dewey’s progressive liberalism, democratic individualism must evolve towards 
democratic socialism: the expansion of every individual’s capacities and powers is 
precisely the process of social coordination requiring some political management. 
Dewey was hardly the first political theorist to identify the function of politics as 
managing the social coordination of everyone’s proper development. This view of 
politics has resulted in theories across the centuries which defend autocracy, aristoc-
racy, fascism, communism, as well as varieties of democracy. These theories almost 
always start from some concrete notion of what constitutes a person’s proper devel-
opment. Dewey’s progressive liberalism is nearly unique because it offers no specific 
concept of what could constitute a person’s proper development. Dewey’s writings 
are replete with pleas for the development and empowerment of people’s abilities. 
But nowhere can Dewey say anything specific about the best character traits or the 
finest virtues or the best way of life for a person in general. There is no specific hu-
man telos in Dewey’s philosophy. Dewey self-consciously refuses to give any such 
specifics: Dewey has no idea what those things are. His ignorance is a key founda-
tion to his theory of democracy. And Dewey would make us see that his ignorance 
should be our ignorance. No one could know what a human being ought to become. 
We can still have some ideas about what a human being ought not to become. 
There should be moral and political constraints upon what a person should become, 
constraints that follow from the ethical principle that all people should have the 
equal opportunity to realize their potential. Political theories have typically re-
mained focused on constraints, because that is the far easier problem to solve: given 
a conception of the human telos, and a notion of the social coordination required 
for groups to attain their telos together, the needed constraints on human behavior 
can be derived fairly easily. Dewey’s political theory has no conception of human 
telos and only an understanding of many of the forms of social coordination tried 
so far. That’s how Dewey derives his theory of democracy: the people themselves 
must take the responsibility for exploring their potentials and coordinating their 
common search using novel social organizations. Democracy is an endless experi-
ment designed and conducted by the people themselves. 
Dewey believed that democracy’s equal concern for the welfare of all persons 
supplies the ultimate ethical ground for the superiority of democracy. Yet this ethi-
cal justification stage is not the final stage of understanding Dewey’s political theory 
and his justification for his specific type of liberal democracy. Two crucial ques-
tions must be asked. (1) Even if the welfare of all ought to be of supreme concern, 
how is it possible to find such concern manifested in each person’s experience of 
community life? (2) What would a democracy that actually approaches this ideal 
of moral equality actually look like?
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thE moral community Justification
Dewey believed that democracy is the form of social and 
political organization that naturally fulfills the ethical 
criterion of the genuine community: that all people are 
committed to the principle of moral equality.
This at last is Dewey’s ultimate justification for democracy. This justification does 
not rest on the principle that each person possesses supreme moral value. Although 
Dewey believed this principle to be true, he also viewed it as an inadequate abstrac-
tion. Taken too concretely, this principle can lead back to the excessive individual-
ism behind the notions of absolute rights and liberties. 
Although each person must have the opportunity for personal development, 
that development does not take place in a vacuum. The social context of personal 
development is fairly acknowledged by defenders of individual rights and personal 
autonomy, who well understand that firm constraints on everyone’s conduct are 
required to prevent society from overwhelming the individual. The evident need 
for firm restraints facilitated the notion of political equality, while a conception of 
moral equality required longer germination. Democracy’s early forms prioritized 
political equality to reinforce restraint, upon the peoples’ conduct for each other 
and also upon the government’s conduct towards the people. For classical eighteenth 
century liberalism, rights and autonomy were deemed sufficient foundations for 
democratic government. However, the responsibilities of each person were thereby 
conceived primarily as responsibilities to refrain from certain conduct (e.g., the 
prevalence of negative rights). Nineteenth century utilitarianism added the de-
mand that citizens exercising their self-ruling power should also search for ways 
to increase the common good and overall happiness of the people. Unfortunately, 
the contradictions between simultaneously trying to protect individuals from so-
ciety and trying to increase overall social welfare were inescapable and unsolvable. 
Liberalism and utilitarianism were headed for a collision precisely because they 
agreed on the centrality of the individual qua individual, making it difficult to jus-
tify personal sacrifice for the greater good. Compromise forms of political liber-
alism then proliferated across the landscape of twentieth century political theory 
as various combinations and relations of deontological and utilitarian principles 
suggested themselves. 
Dewey proposed a radical way to transcend this impasse: each person should 
conceive of his or her own good as integrally connected with the welfare of all others. 
But why should people accept this conception? As an empirical question, whether 
one’s good will be positively related to the social good may be statistically evaluated. 
Even if this positive correlation is valid for the vast majority of people in most sorts 
of societies, as Dewey believes, this empirical fact is not a sufficiently secure founda-
tion for democracy. Rather, Dewey specifically proposed that a person should highly 
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value the common good precisely because it is the common good and not merely be-
cause that person finds the common good to be also good for him or her individually. 
Dewey realized that a severe obstacle to encouraging people to highly value the 
common good is the notion that the person qua individual is the supreme locus of 
moral and political value. That individualism obscures the realization of community. 
A community for Dewey is more than just a voluntary association of people cooperat-
ing for some common goal: additionally, the members of this social group all work to 
sustain this group because they value the fact that all are benefitting, and not merely 
because they are personally benefitting. In a genuine community, occasional sacrifice 
for others is easily accounted for; altruism is not mysterious or irrational. The com-
munity, defined in this way by Dewey, supplies the way of life vital to democracy:
Regarded as an idea, democracy is not an alternative to other principles of 
associated life. It is the idea of community life itself. . . . Wherever there is 
conjoint activity whose consequences are appreciated as good by all singular 
persons who take part in it, and where the realization of the good is such as 
to effect an energetic desire and effort to sustain it in being just because it is a 
good shared by all, there is in so far a community. The clear consciousness of 
a communal life, in all its implications, constitutes the idea of democracy.27 
On Dewey’s definition of community, it is not necessary for people to value 
others as highly as they value themselves; no radical egalitarianism lurks here. 
Obviously, communities will fall apart if too many people feel that excessive sac-
rifice is demanded of them. All the same, communities must be glued together by 
some powerful form of mutual regard and concern in order to function well and 
enjoy longevity. Dewey argued that the political principles of restraint formulated 
by classical liberalism cannot generate that degree of mutual regard and concern, 
since they proceed from an excessive regard for personal value. 
What foundation for the community could simultaneously supply the justi-
fication for political restraint and also the motivation for a high degree of mutual 
regard and concern? Dewey offers an ethical foundation: the community’s members 
are faithfully committed to the principle of moral equality. This commitment may 
be manifested in a wide variety of ways, too many to be enumerated. At minimum 
each person’s commitment to moral equality is embodied in his or her moral experi-
ence of community life. In The Public and Its Problems Dewey envisions a genuinely 
moral community adequate for large populations: the Great Community. In the 
Great Community, everyone’s moral experience of conducting all social relation-
ships in the spirit of equality supplies the motivation that each citizens needs for 
peacefully resolving social conflicts: 
Democracy as a way of life is controlled by personal faith in personal day-by-
day working together with others. Democracy is the belief that even when 
needs and ends or consequences are different for each individual, the habit of 
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amicable cooperation—which may include, as in sport, rivalry and competi-
tion—is itself a priceless addition to life. To take as far as possible every con-
flict which arises—and they are bound to arise—out of the atmosphere and 
medium of force, of violence as a means of settlement into that of discussion 
and of intelligence is to treat those who disagree—even profoundly—with 
us as those from whom we may learn, and in so far, as friends. A genuinely 
democratic faith in peace is faith in the possibility of conducting disputes, 
controversies and conflicts as cooperative undertakings in which both par-
ties learn by giving the other a chance to express itself, instead of having one 
party conquer by forceful suppression of the other.28 
Dewey’s conception of democracy as primarily a cultural way of life is the founda-
tion for his justification of democracy as a political system. In the democratic way 
of life, people are already motivated to cooperate for group gain, and motivated 
to use nonviolent means to overcome obstacles to cooperation. Of course, many 
people also have motivation to cheat as free riders, harm the interests of others, or 
use violent means for gain. The sources of social conflict are many, and government 
can be a tool for managing social conflict. Democratic government ideally should 
be the formal arrangement of political power that most exemplifies the principles 
of the democratic way of life. These principles are expressed by the epistemic jus-
tification, the individualism justification, and the ethical justification. Each prin-
ciple by itself incompletely and imperfectly treats an aspect of managing social 
conflict; when linked together, they blend into an ideal and practical justification 
for democracy. These three justifications jointly explain how the democratic ideal 
of equality reaches practical fulfillment in the democratic moral community. The 
sort of equality essential to democracy is neither natural equality, material equality, 
nor political equality; only moral equality is the essence of democracy. However, it 
must be stressed again this notion of moral equality needed by Dewey is of a pecu-
liar sort, capable of making democracy practical.
Having no fixed, static conception of the moral good for humanity, Dewey can 
only point to the potentialities and opportunities which each person might explore 
and develop if social conditions are favorable. The moral equality that democracy 
promises is basically an equality of opportunity. This equality of opportunity is shal-
low and hollow if people’s capacities are thought of as delimited beforehand; what is 
important about people is not their actual capacities at any given point in their lives, 
but rather their potential capacities that would be realized under future conditions: 
Democracy is a way of life controlled by a working faith in the possibilities of 
human nature. Belief in the Common Man is a familiar article in the demo-
cratic creed. That belief is without basis and significance save as it means faith 
in the potentialities of human nature as that nature is exhibited in every human 
being irrespective of race, color, sex, birth and family, of material or cultural 
wealth. This faith may be enacted in statutes, but it is only on paper unless it 
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is put in force in the attitudes which human beings display to one another in 
all the incidents and relations of daily life.29 
By prioritizing the future development of everyone’s potential—especially in the ca-
pacities for education, social intelligence, and public deliberation30—Dewey hopes to 
resolve the tension between what is good for the individual and what is good for the 
community. This tension naturally arises between what is good for the community 
now, and what may become good for an individual in the future (the community 
is no longer a good environment for that person). This tension also naturally arises 
between what is good for the individual now, and what may become good for an 
community in the future (a person is no longer a good fit with that community). 
The Platonic solution is to ascertain and fix, once and for all, the capacities of the 
individual and the needs of the community to ensure adequate conformity forever. 
The Deweyan solution takes the exact opposite course: neither the capacities of 
the individual nor the needs of the community are known fixed matters, but these 
instead require endless readjustment to each other as they ceaselessly evolve. This 
social evolution has no telos—no guaranteed direction or eventual harmony—and 
Dewey’s political theory has no need to idealistically postulate such things, just as 
biological evolution has eliminated reference to any ideal direction or final harmony. 
Dewey does postulate continual social conflict and competition. What may 
be a necessary and tragic conflict between the good of the individual and the good 
of the community, if either is given a fixed conception, is profoundly transformed 
by the Deweyan notion of potentiality. There will always be conflicts of many sorts 
within communities; but no tragic and unalterable antagonism is destined to forever 
impoverish either the individual or the community’s good. Furthermore, the social 
conflicts that do constantly arise can be, with serious effort, successfully mediated 
and occasionally resolved before erupting into armed warfare, if participants are 
in part motivated by concern and respect for others. 
Dewey’s preferred form of democracy, what has been here termed “public de-
liberation polyarchy,” describes how social conflicts can be managed by citizens for 
maintaining the Moral Community—what Dewey called the Great Community in 
The Public and Its Problems. A democracy’s citizens, educated in the civic tools of 
social intelligence and motivated by the benefits of cooperation to respect each other, 
can be effective at managing their social conflicts. Furthermore, all people have an 
ethical right to the equal opportunity to become as valuable to the community as 
they can become. Dewey concluded that only democracy can ensure each person’s 
right to participate in social inquiry for community benefit.
notEs
1. Attention to Dewey’s political philosophy has never been greater, evidenced by a 
proliferation of books about Dewey since 1985 and the numerous articles in philosophi-
cal, political science, and legal journals every year. During Dewey’s lifetime, little academic 
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scrutiny was given to his political writings, as documented by James Farr, “John Dewey and 
American Political Science” American Journal of Political Science 43 (April 1999), 520–41. 
Plenty of pragmatists were still to be found, to be sure, across the social sciences; the “eclipse 
of pragmatism” after Dewey’s death occurred only in philosophy departments. The most 
effective philosophers responding to critics of democracy, who were still proliferating into 
the 1970s, came from defenders of Kantian and Lockean traditions, such as John Rawls and 
Robert Nozick. It was only in the aftermath of that debate, centered mostly on the nature 
and justification of rights, that some revivers of republican, communitarian, and deliberative 
models of democracy began to recall Dewey as a leading defender of liberal participatory de-
mocracy. Another significant recollection arose from Richard Rorty’s repeated appreciation 
for Dewey in such writings as “Pragmatism, Relativism and Irrationalism,” Proceedings of the 
American Philosophical Association 53 (August 1980), 719–38; and “Postmodernist Bour-
geois Liberalism.” Journal of Philosophy 80 (October 1983), 583–89. Rorty’s sudden impact 
on political and legal theory in the 1980s and early 1990s is detailed in William G. Weaver, 
“Richard Rorty and the Radical Left,” Virginia Law Review 78 (April 1992), pp. 729–57. More 
recently, Jürgen Habermas has also recognized Dewey; see Between Facts and Norms, trans. 
William Rehg (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998), 110 and 304.
2. For Rorty, Dewey offers a post-metaphysical vision of politics as endless conversation 
without appeal to “truth” or any principles of justice or morality. Some have rightly protested 
that Rorty ignores Dewey’s pragmatic justifications for applying scientific inquiry to moral-
ity and politics. See, for example, Richard Bernstein, “One Step Forward, Two Steps Back-
ward: Richard Rorty on Liberal Democracy and Philosophy,” Political Theory 15 (November 
1987), 538–63, and Robert Westbrook, Democratic Hope: Pragmatism and the Politics of Truth 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), chap. 7. Alan Ryan depicts Dewey’s political 
aspirations as the establishment of a “planning society” to steer between free-market capital-
ism and communism, in John Dewey and the High Tide of American Liberalism (New York: 
W. W. Norton, 1995), chap. 8. Westbrook finds faith in the Great Community lying behind 
and morally guiding the deliberative process of citizen planning, in John Dewey and Ameri-
can Democracy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995), chap. 9. Like Westbrook, J. T. 
Kloppenberg perceives how Dewey’s lingering Hegelianism protests the artificial liberalism 
of excessive individuality and instead emphasizes social connectedness; see Uncertain Vic-
tory: Social Democracy and Progressivism in European and American Thought, 1870–1920 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1986). Only a handful of Dewey commentators go 
further, perceiving that the vocation of citizenship is ultimately moral and humanitarian. 
Jeffrey Stout admires a Dewey who defends democracy as a moral tradition in Democracy 
and Tradition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004). Melvin Rogers also finds 
the quest for ethical life within Dewey’s democratic society in The Undiscovered Dewey: Re-
ligion, Morality, and the Ethos of Democracy (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009). 
William Caspary’s Dewey on Democracy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000) traces 
Dewey’s politics to an ethical demand for peaceful conflict resolution; while Judith Green’s 
Deep Democracy: Community, Diversity, and Transformation (Lanham, MD: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 1999) grounds Dewey’s politics in the ethical quest for pluralism. An outstanding 
defense of Dewey’s theory of deliberative and participatory democracy is by Axel Honneth, 
“Democracy as Reflexive Cooperation: John Dewey and the Theory of Democracy Today,” 
Political Theory 26 (1998), 763–83.
3. LW 2: 304–305. References to the critical edition of Dewey’s works, edited by Jo Ann 
Boydston and published by Southern Illinois University Press, 1967–1990, are indicated by 
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EW (Early Works of John Dewey), MW (Middle Works of John Dewey), or LW (Later Works 
of John Dewey) followed by volume and page numbers.
4. LW 2: 306.
5. LW 2: 326.
6. LW 13: 151.
7. MW 5: 394–95.
8. LW 6: 188.
9. All the same, a minimum set of rights might be defended as pragmatically justifiable 
for all communities that deserve the name. Dewey, as will be seen below, can be interpreted 
as undertaking this sort of defense. See also Beth J. Singer, Pragmatism, Rights, and Democ-
racy (New York: Fordham University Press, 1999).
10. LW 2: 329.
11. LW 11: 375.
12. LW 11: 221.
13. LW 7: 359.
14. As the epistemic justification is the most common interpretation of Dewey’s political 
theory, only a small sample of scholars in this category can be mentioned here. They all agree 
that Dewey held that democracy’s primary function is to supply a public forum for citizens to 
intelligently and fairly deliberate about their social problems. Sidney Hook’s writings are exem-
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